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Abstract
According to an argument by Colin Howson, the no-miracles argu-
ment is contingent on committing the base-rate fallacy and is there-
fore bound to fail. We demonstrate that Howson’s argument only ap-
plies to one of two versions of the no-miracles argument. The other,
more considerate version is not adequately reconstructed in Howson’s
approach and thus remains unaffected by his line of reasoning. We
provide a Bayesian reconstruction of this version of the no-miracles
argument and show that it is valid. We then proceed to discuss a
number of aspects of NMA on that basis.
1 Introduction
The No Miracles Argument (NMA) arguably is the most influential argu-
ment in favour of scientific realism. First formulated under this name in
Putnam 1975, the NMA asserts that the predictive success of science would
be a miracle if predictively successful scientific theories were not (at least)
approximately true. The NMA may be framed as a three step argument.
First, it is asserted that the predictive success we witness in science does not
have any satisfactory explanation in the absence of a realist interpretation of
scientific theory. Predictive success is often understood (see e.g. Musgrave
1988) in terms of the novel predictive success of science. It is then argued
that a realist interpretation of scientific theory can provide an explanation of
scientific success. Finally, abductive reasoning is deployed to conclude that,
given the first two points, scientific realism is probably true.
All three steps of NMA were questioned already shortly after its formula-
tion. It was argued that scientific success needs no explanation beyond what
can be given in an empiricist framework (van Fraassen 1980), that scientific
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realism cannot provide the kind of explanation of predictive success aimed
at by the realist (Laudan 1981) and that the use of abductive reasoning in
a philosophical context already presumes a realist point of view (Fine 1986).
The debate on all these points continues until this day.
In the year 2000, Colin Howson presented an interesting new line of criticism
(Howson 2000) that did not look at one of the three individual steps of the
NMA but questioned the overall logical validity of the argument. Howson
argued that a Bayesian reconstruction of the NMA revealed a logical flaw
in the argument’s structure: it commits the base-rate fallacy. Since then, a
number of articles have been devoted to the discussion of Howson’s point.
Howson’s line of reasoning was followed and extended by Magnus and Cal-
lender (2003). It was criticised on various accounts in Psillos (2009) (which
was answered by Callender 2013), Worrall (2007), Menke (2014), Sprenger
(2015), and Henderson (forthcoming).
In this article, we present a different formalization of the NMA than what
has been provided by Howson. This new formalization will clarify the status
and the limits of Howson’s argument and put the critical points mentioned
in the above-cited literature into a bigger context. We start with a rehearsal
of Howson’s argument in Section 2. Section 3 then presents the observa-
tion, first made in Dawid (2008), that one has to distinguish two kinds of
the NMA, which we will call individual theory-based NMA and frequency-
based NMA. Menke (2014) and Henderson (forthcoming) pointed out that
Howson’s formalization applies to the former but not to the latter kind of
NMA. In Section 4, we present a formalization of frequency-based NMA that
demonstrates that (i) the individual theory-based NMA is sub-argument of
the frequency-based NMA, and that (ii) Howson only reconstructs this sub-
argument. In Section 5, we argue that, while there is a strand in scientific
realism that reduces NMA to the individual theory-based NMA, Putnam
and Boyd, the first main exponents of the argument, did clearly endorse
the frequency-based NMA. Sections 6 then provides a more thorough discus-
sion of the differences in perspective between individual theory-based and
frequency-based NMA. Section 7 finally formally demonstrates that a core
worry with respect to a frequency-based understanding of the NMA can be
dispelled.
2 Howson’s Argument
In his book Howson (2000), Colin Howson makes the remarkable claim that
the NMA commits the base-rate fallacy and therefore is invalid on logical
grounds. Howson provides the following Bayesian formalization of this ar-
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gument: Let S be a binary propositional variable with values S: Hypothesis
H is predictively successful, and ¬S: H is predictively unsuccessful. Let T
be the binary propositional variable with values T: H is approximately true,
and ¬T: H is not approximately true. Next, the adherent of the NMA makes
two assumptions:
A1: P (S|T) is quite large.
A2: P (S|¬T) < k  1.
A1 states that approximately true theories are typically predictively success-
ful, and A2 states that theories that are not at least approximately true are
typically not predictively successful. Note that ¬T is the so-called catch-all
hypothesis. For the sake of the argument, we consider both assumptions to
be uncontroversial, although anti-realists objected to both of them (see, e.g.,
Laudan (1981) and Stanford (2006)). The adherent of the NMA then infers:
C: P (T|S) is large.
As Howson correctly points out, the stated argument commits the base-rate
fallacy: C is only justified if the prior probability P (T) is sufficiently large.
This condition, however, is not in the set A := {A1,A2} of assumptions.
If it were, we would beg the question because the truth of a predictively
successful theory would then be derived from the assumption that the truth
of the theory in question is a priori sufficiently probable, which is exactly
what an anti-realist denies.1
3 Two Versions of the NMA
Does Howson’s formal reconstruction constitute a faithful representation of
the NMA? It has been pointed out in Dawid (2008) that two conceptually
distinct versions of the NMA have to be distinguished. They differ with
respect to the issue as to what exactly has to be explained by the realist
conjecture.2
The first version is the following: We consider one specific predictively suc-
cessful scientific theory. The approximate truth of that theory is then de-
ployed for explaining why it is predictively successful. We shall call a NMA
1Howson (2015) indeed calls the statement ’one should endorse the truth of an empir-
ically confirmed theory if one believes P (T ) > P (S|¬T )’ the only valid conclusion from
NMA-like reasoning. However, since no reason for believing the stated relation is given,
this form of ”NMA” cannot seriously be called an argument for scientific realism.
2In Dawid (2008), the two forms of the NMA are called “analytic NMA” and “epistemic
NMA”.
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based on individual predictive success an individual theory-based NMA. Ac-
cording to the second version, what is to be explained by the realist conjecture
is the observation that theories which are developed and held by scientists
tend to be predictively successful. In this version, the NMA does not rely on
the observation that one specific theory is predictively successful but rather
on an observed characteristic of science as a whole or at least of a more nar-
rowly specified segment of science. Theories that are part of that segment,
such as theories that are part of mature science or that are part of a specific
mature research field, are expected to be predictively successful. We will call
a NMA based on the frequency of predictive success frequency-based NMA.3
Menke (2014) and Henderson (forthcoming) have pointed out that Howson’s
argument only addresses what we call individual theory-based NMA. The
frequency-based version of the NMA is not adequately represented by How-
son’s reconstruction.
In the following section, we develop a formalization of frequency-based NMA
and therefore provide the basis for a fully formalized analysis of NMA. This
will help us to investigate how and to what extent the frequency-based version
of the NMA reaches beyond Howson’s reconstruction.
4 Formalizing Frequency-Based NMA
To begin with, we specify a scientific discipline or research field R.4 We
count all nE theories in R that have been empirically tested and determine
the number nS of theories that were empirically successful. We can thus state
the following observation:
O: nS out of nE theories in R were predictively successful.
Now let us assume that we are confronted with a new and so far empirically
untested theory H in R. We want to extract the probability P (S|O) for
3A related but different distinction between two forms of NMA was made in (Barnes
2003). Barnes calls the argument from a theory’s success the “miraculous theory argu-
ment” and contrasts it with the “miraculous choice argument” from the scientists’ actual
development and choice of successful theories. The miraculous theory argument is nec-
essarily an individual theory-based NMA, since it presumes the predictive success of the
individual theory under consideration. Therefore, no frequency of predictive success can
be specified within the framework of the miraculous theory argument. A miraculous choice
argument may be either of the individual theory or of the frequency-based type.
4One might argue that a strong statement on predictive success in a research field R
always requires the specification of some conditions C that separate more promising from
less promising theories in the field. However, accounting for this additional step does not
affect the basic structure of the argument, which is why, in order to keep things simple,
we won’t explicitly mention these conditions in our reconstruction.
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the predictive success S of H given observation O. In order not to beg the
question by assuming the predictive success of H a priori, we assume a prior
probability P (S) = , where  can be arbitrarily small.
We then assume that each new theory that comes up in R can be treated
as a random pick with respect to predictive success. That is, we assume
that there is a certain overall rate of predictively successful theories in R
and that, in the absence of further knowledge, the success chances of a new
theory should be estimated according to our best estimate R of that success
rate:
P (S|O) = R (1)
R will be based on observation O. The most straightforward assessment of
R is to use the frequentist information and to identify R with
Rfreq =
nS
nE
. (2)
We will adopt it in the remainder. To proceed with our formal analysis of
the frequency based-NMA, we need to make two assumptions similar to A:
AO1 : P (S|T,O) is quite large.
AO2 : P (S|¬T,O) < k  1
Note that scientific realists assume that the truth of H is the dominating
element in explaining the theory’s predictive success. If that is so, then S
is roughly conditionally independent of O given T and we have P (S|T,O) ≈
P (S|T) and P (S|¬T,O) ≈ P (S|¬T). The conditions AO1 and AO2 can then be
roughly equated with the conditions A1 and A2. For the sake of generality,
we will nevertheless use conditions AO1 and A
O
2 in the following analysis.
Let us now come to our crucial point, viz. to show that accounting for ob-
servation O blocks the base-rate fallacy. The base-rate fallacy in individ-
ual theory-based NMA consisted in disregarding the possibility of arbitrarily
small priors P (T). In frequency-based NMA, however, the crucial probability
is P (T|O) rather than P (T). Updating the probability of S on observation
O has an impact on P (T|O). To see this, we start with the law of total
probability,
P (S|O) = P (S|T,O)P (T|O) + P (S|¬T,O)P (¬T|O), (3)
and obtain
P (T|O) = P (S|O)− P (S|¬T,O)
P (S|T,O)− P (S|¬T,O) . (4)
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(The proof is in Appendix A.) Two points can be extracted from eq. (4) and
assumptions AO1 and A
O
2 . First, we conclude that
P (S|T,O) ≥ P (S|O). (5)
In particular,
P (S|T,O) = P (S|O) iff P (T|O) = 1. (6)
Second, we obtain that
P (T|O) > P (S|O)− k = R− k . (7)
(The proof is in Appendix B.) Hence, P (T|O) is bounded from below if
k < R. This will typically be the case as (i) k is small (by assumption AO2 )
and (ii) R ≈ nS/nE (by eq. (2)) is large (see, however, our discussion in
Section 7). Thus, if a supporter of the NMA uses a form of assumption A01
that satisfies k < R, then the base-rate fallacy is avoided. Note that the first
and crucial inference in frequency-based NMA is made before accounting for
the predictive success of H itself and relies on relating P (S|O) to P (T|O)
based on the law of total probability.
Once H has been empirically tested and found to be empirically successful,
we can, just as in the case of individual theory-based NMA, update on S, the
predictive success of H.5 Using eqs. (5) and (6) and the identity
P (T|S,O) = P (S|T,O)
P (S|O) · P (T|O), (8)
it is easy to see that Bayesian updating from P (T|O) to P (T|S,O) further
increases the probability of T for predictively successful theories as long as
P (T|O) < 1.
Comparing this formalization of frequency-based NMA with Howson’s recon-
struction, we see that Howson only reconstructs the second part of frequency-
based NMA, which leads from P (T|O) to P (T|S,O). He leaves out the part
where P (T|O) is extracted from the observed success frequency nS/nE based
on the prior P (T). Howson’s base rate fallacy charge crucially relies on the
understanding that the specification of the truth probability before updating
under the predictive success of the given theory is not part of the NMA.
Howson’s reconstruction thus is insensitive to the observed frequency of pre-
dictive success and amounts to a formalization of individual theory-based
NMA.
5Note that the predictive success of H will change the value of R. However, this change
will be small if nE is large.
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5 Do Realists Use Frequency-Based NMA?
The NMA has a long and chequered history. Who among its exponents en-
dorsed individual theory-based NMA and who endorsed its frequency-based
counterpart? Here is the precise wording of Hilary Putnam’s famous first
formulation of NMA:
The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy
that doesn’t make the success of science a miracle. That terms in
mature science typically refer [. . . ], that the theories in a mature
science are typically true, that the same term can refer to the same
thing even when it occurs in different theories – these statements
are viewed by the scientific realist not as necessary truths but as
the only scientific explanation of the success of science and hence
as part of any adequate scientific description of science and its
relations to its objects. (Putnam 1975, our emphasis)
Note that Putnam speaks of the success of science rather than of the suc-
cess of an individual scientific theory. He clearly understands the success of
science as a general and observable phenomenon. Since he obviously would
not want to say that each and every scientific theory is always predictively
successful, he thereby asserts that we find a high success rate nS/nE based on
our observations of the history of (mature) science. He then infers from the
success of science that mature scientific theories are typically approximately
true. That is, he infers P (T|O) from the observed rate nS/nE. We conclude
that Putnam presented a clear-cut frequency-based version of NMA.
The other early main exponent of the NMA, Richard Boyd (see, e.g., Boyd
(1984) and Boyd (1985)), is committed to frequency-based NMA as well.
Boyd emphasizes that only what he calls the “predictive reliability of well-
confirmed scientific theories” and the “reliability of scientific methodology in
identifying predictively reliable theories” provides the basis for the NMA.
In other words, an individual case of having predictive success could be
explained by good luck and therefore would not license a NMA. Only the
reliability of generating predictive success in a field, i.e. a high frequency of
predictive success, provides an acceptable basis for the NMA.
Later expositions of NMA at times are not sensitive to the distinction be-
tween individual theory-based NMA and frequency-based NMA and therefore
are not clearly committed to one or the other version of the argument. In
some cases, Putnam’s phrase “success of science” is used at one stage of the
exposition while the thrust of the exposition seems to endorse an individual
theory-based NMA perspective. A classic example of this kind is Musgrave
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(1988). Psillos (2009) defends individual theory-based NMA in his attempt
to refute Howson’s criticism of the NMA.
6 Discussion
Having thus established that the frequency-based NMA may be called the
canonical form of the NMA, we now want to deepen our understanding of
the distinction between individual theory-based and frequency-based NMA.
To that end, it is helpful to look at another aspect of Howson’s line of rea-
soning. More specifically, the following objection to Howson’s argument may
be made.6 A subjective Bayesian approach by definition relies on prior prob-
abilities of the hypotheses under scrutiny. In other words, in a Bayesian
framework even the most convincing set of empirical data leads to an en-
dorsement of the tested hypothesis only for a given range of priors. Why
should this be a lethal problem for (individual theory based) NMA when it
isn’t for all kinds of scientific analysis that can be reconstructed in Bayesian
terms?
In order to answer this objection to Howson’s argument, one has to take a
look at the reason why, from a Bayesian perspective, science can reach stable
and more or less objective conclusions despite the necessity of starting from
subjective priors. The reason is that, in a standard scientific context, posteri-
ors converge under repeated empirical testing. Therefore, if one wants to test
a hypothesis, any prior probability one may choose (apart from dogmatic de-
nial, which corresponds to a prior probability of zero), can lead to posteriors
beyond a probability threshold set for acknowledging conclusive confirmation
if a sufficient amount of data is collected. The fact that science is modelled
as allowing for an infinite series of empirical testing therefore neutralizes the
threat of subjective priors to the reliability of scientific claims.
Howson’s claim that the NMA involves a base rate fallacy in this light
amounts to the claim that the evidence structure that enters the NMA is
not of the kind to be found in scientific testing. It does not project a se-
ries of updatings under a sequence of observations like in scientific testing.
Rather, it relies on acknowledging exactly one characteristic of a given the-
ory: its novel predictive success. In Howson’s reconstruction of the NMA,
there is only one updating under the observation of predictive success. This,
Howson argues, is no adequate structure for establishing the hypothesis under
scrutiny as long as no limits to the priors are assumed. Since no anti-realist
would subscribe to such limits, the (individual theory-based) NMA cannot
establish scientific realism.
6We thank Brian Skyrms for bringing it up.
8
Howson makes a crucial point about the individual theory-based NMA. The
problem of individual theory-based NMA is not that the sample size happens
to be 1. The problem runs deeper: individual theory-based NMA does not
provide a framework for the sample testing of a rate of predictive success at
all. The logic of the argument starts with selecting a theory that is known
to have made correct novel predictions. The argument is not based on an
observation about the research process that has led up to developing and
endorsing scientific theories but only on an observation about the theory’s
relation to empirical data. Since the predictively successful theory is being
selected ex post, individual theory-based NMA provides no basis for estab-
lishing whether the predictive success of the given theory is surprising – is “a
miracle”, if you want – on any account. To use an analogy, if one selects the
winning ticket of a lottery after the draw, the fact that it won is no surprise.
Frequency-based NMA, to the contrary, relies on an observation about the
research process: within a given field, scientific theories that satisfy some set
of conditions happen to be predictively successful with a significantly high
probability. This observation is grounded in a series of individual observa-
tions of the predictive successes of individual theories. The empirical testing
of each theory serves as a new data point. The observation O of a certain fre-
quency of predictive success therefore is the result of a quasi-scientific testing
series. The probability P (T|O), which is extracted from O based on the law
of total probability, can be decoupled from the prior probability P (T) as it is
inferred from a quasi-scientific testing series. The mechanism of objectifying
results that work in a scientific framework is also applicable in the case of
NMA: anyone who takes the available data to be inconclusive can resort to
further testing.
Specifically, if a certain number of data points are available for extracting O
and an anti-realist observer (who has a very low prior P (T) before observing
predictive success in the field but, for the sake of the argument, accepts
conditions AO1 and A
O
2 ) considers the available amount of data too small
for overcoming her very small prior probability P (T), one can just wait for
new theories in the research context to get tested. If the additional data also
supports a high frequency of predictive success, our anti-realist would at some
stage acknowledge that the empirical data has established realism.7 The deep
7The present analysis implies that the proposal by Menke (2014) to use NMA only
with respect to theories that show multiple predictive successes is not satisfactory. Since
Menke’s suggestion remains within the framework of individual theory-based NMA, it
does not solve the structural problem Howson is pointing to. A theory that happens to
make two novel predictions and is successful in both cases may be more likely to be true
than one with only one case of novel predictive success (albeit one may object to treating
instances of novel predictive success statistically as independent picks as it is proposed by
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reason why frequency-based NMA avoids the base rate fallacy therefore lies
in the fact that it provides a framework in which the convergence behaviour
of posteriors under repeated updating can be exploited.
7 Does NMA need a high Frequency of Pre-
dictive Success?
References to success frequencies in the context of the NMA have been
avoided by a number of philosophers of science for one reason: it seemed
imprudent to ground an argument for realism on a claim that seemed quite
questionable. Given the many failures of scientific theories, it looked uncon-
vincing to assert a high frequency of predictive success in any scientific field.
In this light, it is important to have a clear understanding of the success
frequencies that are actually required for having a convincing NMA. In the
following, we address this question within our formalized reconstruction.
The strength of the NMA is expressed by P (T|S,O). In order to make a
strong case for scientific realism, we demand that
P (T|S,O) > K, (9)
where K is some reasonably high probability value. K = 1/2 may be viewed
as a plausible condition for taking the NMA seriously. How does a condition
on P (T|S,O) translate into a condition on P (S|O) and therefore on the (ob-
served) success frequency R? Obviously, this depends on the posited values
of P (S|T,O) and P (S|¬T,O). Eqs. (4) and (8) imply that
P (T|S,O) = P (S|T,O)
P (S|O) ·
(
P (S|O)− P (S|¬T,O)
P (S|T,O)− P (S|¬T,O)
)
. (10)
We know already that the NMA works only for P (S|O) < P (S|T,O). From
eq. (10) we can further infer (proof omitted) that, for fixed P (S|O) and
fixed P (S|¬T,O) < P (S|O), P (T|S,O) decreases with increasing P (S|T,O).
Therefore, it is most difficult for P (T|S,O) to reach the value K if P (S|T,O)
has the maximal value 1. It thus makes sense to focus on this case, which
gives
P (T|S,O) = 1
P (S|O) ·
(
P (S|O)− P (S|¬T,O)
1− P (S|¬T,O)
)
. (11)
Menke). But individual theories just give us the predictions they happen to imply. There
is no perspective of a series of novel predictions that can be understood in terms of an
open series of empirical testing. Howson’s core objection thus remains valid.
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Condition (9) then turns into
1
P (S|O) ·
(
P (S,O)− P (S|¬T,O)
1− P (S|¬T,O)
)
> K, (12)
which leads to the following condition for P (S|O):
P (S|O) > P (S|¬T,O)
1−K +K · P (S|¬T,O) (13)
(The proof is in Appendix C.) For small P (S|¬T,O), a good approximation
of the condition expressed in eq. (13) is
P (S|O) > P (S|¬T,O)
1−K . (14)
For K = 1/2, we thus obtain
P (S|O) > 2P (S|¬T,O). (15)
In the large nE-limit, this implies
nS/nE > 2P (S|¬T,O). (16)
We thus see that we don’t need a high rate of predictive success in a scientific
field for having a significant argument in favour of scientific realism. The
ratio nS/nE may be small as long as it is larger than the assumed value
of P (S|¬T,O). In a sense, the understanding that the NMA needs a high
frequency of predictive success is based on the inverse mistake to the one
committed by the endorser of the individual theory-based NMA. While the
latter only focuses on the updating under the novel predictive success of an
individual theory, the former does not take this updating into account.
The possibility to base a NMA on a small nS/nE is significant because many
arguments and observations which lower our assessments of nS/nE in a scien-
tific field at the same time enter our assessment of P (S|¬T,O). Take, for ex-
ample, the following argument against a high ratio of predictive success. “Sci-
entists develop many theories which they don’t find promising themselves.
Clearly, those theories have a very low frequency of predictive success.” It
is equally clear, though, that most of these theories are false and therefore
lower P (S|¬T,O). Examples of this kind show that lines of reasoning that
isolate segments of the theory space where both nS/nE and P (S|¬T,O) are
very small provide a framework in which the claim nS/nE > P (S|¬T,O)
can make sense even if the overall value nS/nE in a research field is rather
unimpressive.
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8 Conclusion
The following picture of the role of the base rate fallacy with respect to the
NMA has emerged. Howson’s argument decisively destroys the individual
theory-based NMA, which has been endorsed by some adherents to NMA
and clearly was not understood to be logically flawed by many others. This
is an important step towards a clearer understanding of the NMA and the
scientific realism debate as a whole. However, the individual theory based
NMA is only one part of the NMA as it was presented by Putnam and Boyd.
The full argument, which we call the frequency-based NMA, does not commit
the base rate fallacy.
A clearer understanding of what the base rate fallacy amounts to in the con-
text of the NMA can be achieved by phrasing it in terms of the convergence
behaviour of posteriors. An argument commits the base rate fallacy if it (i)
ignores the role of the subjective priors and if it (ii) does not offer a perspec-
tive of convergence behaviour under a sequence of updatings under incoming
data. The individual theory-based NMA is structurally incapable of provid-
ing such a sequence of updatings because it addresses only the spectrum of
novel predictions provided by one single theory. The frequency-based NMA,
to the contrary, is based on a general observation about the research process
(the frequency of predictive success in a research field) that can be tested by
collecting a sequence of data points, where each data point corresponds to
the observed novel predictive success of an individual theory. Therefore, the
process of testing the hypothesis“theories that have novel predictive success
are probably true” under the assumptions AO1 and A
O
2 is of the same type
as scientific testing and does not commit the base rate fallacy.
One worry about the frequency-based NMA is related to the understanding
that the high frequencies of predictive success necessary for having a con-
vincing NMA cannot be found in actual science. The formalization of the
frequency-based NMA demonstrates that such high frequencies are not nec-
essary for achieving high truth probabilities with respect to theories with
novel predictive success.
To end with, let us emphasise one point. The fact that the NMA, if cor-
rectly reconstructed, does not commit the base-rate fallacy doesn’t imply its
soundness. A supporter of the frequency-based NMA must justify assump-
tions AO1 and A
O
2 and must explain on which grounds she takes a sufficiently
high frequency of predictive success to be borne out by the data. Whether
or not that can be achieved lies beyond the scope of this article.
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A Derivation of Eq. (4)
We use the law of total probability and obtain:
P (S|O) = P (S|T,O)P (T|O) + P (S|¬T,O)P (¬T|O)
= P (S|T,O)P (T|O) + P (S|¬T,O) · [1− P (T|O)]
= P (T|O) · [P (S|T,O)− P (S|¬T,O)] + P (S|¬T,O)
Hence,
P (T|O) = P (S|O)− P (S|¬T,O)
P (S|T,O)− P (S|¬T,O) .
Here we have used that P (S|T,O) > P (S|¬T,O), which follows from as-
sumptions AO1 and A
O
2 .
B Derivation of Eq. (7)
We start with eq. (4) and obtain
P (T|O) = P (S|O)− P (S|¬T,O)
P (S|T,O)− P (S|¬T,O)
≥ P (S|O)− P (S|¬T,O)
1− P (S|¬T,O)
≥ P (S|O)− P (S|¬T,O) (17)
> P (S|O)− k. (18)
Here eq. (17) follows from assumptions AO1 and A
O
2 and eq. (18) follows
from assumption AO2 .
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C Derivation of Eq. (13)
We start with eq. (12) and obtain:
1
P (S|O) ·
(
P (S|O)− P (S|¬T,O)
1− P (S|¬T,O)
)
> K
1
P (S|O) · (P (S|O)− P (S|¬T,O)) > K (1− P (S|¬T,O))
1− P (S|¬T,O)
P (S|O) > K (1− P (S|¬T,O))
1−K (1− P (S|¬T,O)) > P (S|¬T,O)
P (S|O)
P (S|O) · (1−K(1− P (S|¬T,O))) > P (S|¬T,O)
Hence,
P (S|O) > P (S|¬T,O)
1−K +K · P (S|¬T,O) .
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